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Abstract
Calls for censorship have been made in response to the proliferation of flat Earth videos on YouTube, but these videos are
likely convincing to very few. Instead, people may worry these videos are brainwashing others. That individuals believe
other people will be more influenced by media messages than themselves is called third-person perception (TPP), and the
consequences from those perceptions, such as calls for censorship, are called third-person effects (TPE). Here, we conduct
three studies that examine the flat Earth phenomenon using TPP and TPE as a theoretical framework. We first measured
participants’ own perceptions of the convincingness of flat Earth arguments presented in YouTube videos and compared
these to participants’ perceptions of how convincing others might find the arguments. Instead of merely looking at ratings
of one’s self vs. a general ‘other,’ however, we asked people to consider a variety of identity groups who differ based on
political party, religiosity, educational attainment, and area of residence (e.g., rural, urban). We found that participants’
religiosity and political party were the strongest predictors of TPP across the different identity groups. In our second and
third pre-registered studies, we found support for our first study’s conclusions, and we found mixed evidence for whether
TPP predict support for censoring YouTube among the public.
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1. Introduction
Flat Earth ideology resurfaced from obscurity due to a
proliferation of misinformation on YouTube (Landrum &
Olshansky, 2019; Paolillo, 2018). True believers, though,
are rare. Despite the videos’ presence on YouTube and
the widespread media coverage the movement has re-
ceived, a 2018 poll reports only 5% of the U.S. public say
they doubt the true shape of Earth, and only 2% are cer-
tain that Earth is flat (YouGov, 2018a). A greater propor-
tion of the U.S. public, for example, believe they have
seen a ghost (15%; YouGov, 2018b).
While most do not find the arguments made in
flat Earth videos persuasive, at least at first exposure
(Landrum, Olshansky, & Richards, 2019), a barrage of
news articles highlight calls for YouTube to crack down
on the spread of misinformation; and YouTube has re-
sponded by updating its recommendation algorithm
(e.g., Binder, 2019; YouTube, 2019). People’s strong nega-
tive reactions are not likely due to fears that they, them-
selves, will be persuaded, but fears that the videos will
brainwash others (Scott, 2019). Indeed, research finds
that individuals often overestimate the effects media
have on others (and generally underestimate the effects
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on themselves), a phenomenon called third-person per-
ception (TPP; Gunther, 1995; Perloff, 1993, 2009; Salwen,
1998). TPP, then, is thought to lead to certain attitudes
and/or actions, such as support for censorship; and this is
called third-person effects (TPE; Davison, 1983; Gunther,
1991; Perloff, 1993).
In three studies, we examine the flat Earth YouTube
phenomenon using TPP and TPE as a theoretical frame-
work. In these studies, we asked participants how con-
vincing they found flat Earth arguments from YouTube
videos and compared this to their expectations for how
convincing others might find the arguments. Instead of
merely looking at ratings of one’s self vs. a general ‘other,’
however, we ask about a variety of groups who differ
based on political party, religiosity, educational attain-
ment, and area of residence (rural, urban).
We had two aims for this research. First, we aimed to
determinewhich identity groups our participants believe
are more susceptible than themselves to the arguments
presented in flat Earth videos, andwhether these TPP are
conditional on participants’ own characteristics (e.g., po-
litical party, religiosity). Second, we aimed to determine
the extent to which TPP predict support for censoring
YouTube compared to other participant characteristics
(e.g., political party, conspiracy mentality, YouTube use).
1.1. TPP vs. TPE
The expectation that others will be more influenced
by media messages than oneself is referred to as TPP,
whereas the attitudes or behaviors that stem from TPP,
such as calling for censorship of those messages, are re-
ferred to as TPE (Davison, 1983). The TPP and TPE model
takes a meta-perspective, looking not at the direct ef-
fects of media but at the effects that result from people’s
beliefs about media effects (Perloff, 2009).
1.2. TPP of Conspiracy Theories
Although TPP and TPE are well researched in areas such
as advertisements (e.g., Huh, Delorme, & Reid, 2004),
violent media (e.g., Hoffner & Buchanan, 2002; Innes
& Zeitz, 1988), and pornography (e.g., Gunther, 1995;
Rojas, Shah, & Faber, 1996; Zhao & Cai, 2008), very little
work examines TPP of conspiracy theories.
Douglas and Sutton conducted one such study with
a U.K. student sample in the 2000s, asking about con-
spiracy theories surrounding the death of Princess Diana
(Douglas & Sutton, 2008). Besides asking participants
howmuch they and others would agree with the conspir-
acy statements (i.e., current selves, current others), they
also asked participants to speculate how much they and
others would have agreed with the statements prior to
having read the material (i.e., retrospective selves, ret-
rospective others). Inconsistent with prior work on TPP,
collapsed across current and retrospective ratings, par-
ticipants did not expect others to agree with the con-
spiracy statements more than themselves. However, par-
ticipants did expect others to exhibit greater attitude
change (Douglas & Sutton, 2008).
Our study differs from Douglas and Sutton (2008) in
a number of ways, but a central difference is who the
‘others’ are. Whereas Douglas and Sutton asked partic-
ipants to rate their own classmates—a group of ‘oth-
ers’ whom the participants might have seen as similar to
themselves, we asked about several identity groups that
could range from very similar to very different from our
participants. We expected that participants’ TPP would
vary based on perceived social distance (the ‘social dis-
tance corollary,’ Cohen, Mutz, Price, & Gunther, 1988).
1.3. Social Distance and TPP
Social distance has been at the center of much research
on TPP (e.g., Cohen et al., 1988; Eveland, Nathanson,
Detenber, & McLeod, 1999; Paek, 2009; Shen & Huggins,
2013). Cohen et al. (1988), for example, demonstrated
that TPE magnify as the ‘other’ group becomes more ab-
stract. These researchers asked Stanford University un-
dergraduates to consider the effects of negative political
ads on themselves, on other Stanford students, on other
Californians, and on public opinion at large (Cohen et al.,
1988). As social distances between an individual and ‘oth-
ers’ increase, the individuals’ perceptions of the others
becomemore abstract; and themore abstract others are
to us, the greater we believe they are susceptible to neg-
ative media effects (Meirick, 2004).
Social distance can also be conceptualized as psycho-
logical distance, or the degree of (dis)similarity between
the self and the other (Perloff, 1993), with the resulting
perception exemplifying in-group/out-group bias (e.g.,
David, Morrison, Johnson, & Ross, 2002; Gardikiotis,
2008; Lo & Wei, 2002; Wei, Chia, & Lo, 2011). Jang and
Kim (2018), for example, found strong TPP based on po-
litical party affiliation: Republicans believed Democratic
voters would be more susceptible to so-called ‘fake
news,’ whereas Democrats believed Republican voters
would be more susceptible.
1.4. Current Article
Three studies examine our research aims. The first study
explores associations between YouTube users’ individ-
ual characteristics (e.g., their political party affiliation
and religiosity) and their expectations for how convinc-
ing other people would find YouTube clips arguing Earth
is flat. These ‘other people’ included people described
as Democrats, Republicans, biblical literalists, atheists,
rural dwellers, urban dwellers, those who did not go
to college, and those who attended graduate school.
The second study examines the relationships between
YouTube users’ individual characteristics, third-person
ratings, and their support for censoring such content on
YouTube. The third study attempts to replicate study 2
with a larger and more nationally representative sample
that was not limited to YouTube users.
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2. Study 1
2.1. Participants
We recruited 397 U.S. participants who regularly
use YouTube via TurkPrime, a service of Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk. We requested a naïve sample: The top
2% of most active MTurkers were not eligible for our
study. Overall, 57% of the participants were female, and
racial/ethnic breakdowns were as follows: 76% White,
11% Black/African American, 7% Hispanic/Latino, 6%
Asian, and 2% other. The average age of participants
was 38.39 years (median = 36, SD = 12.29). 11% com-
pleted only high school, 38% attended some college,
35% received some degree from college, and 16% com-
pleted graduate school. About 43% identify as Democrat,
37% identify as independent, and only 21% identify
as Republican.
MTurk samples tend to be higher educated and hold
more politically liberal views compared to U.S. nation-
ally representative populations, and this was true of
our sample. They also tend to have a higher number of
atheists and agnostics compared to the U.S. population
(Burnham, Le, & Piedmont, 2018), which appears to be
the case for our sample. Over 41% of our study 1 partici-
pants said that they are not religious and never pray.
2.2. Study Design and Procedures
Data for study 1 were collected as part of a study examin-
ing susceptibility to flat Earth arguments on YouTube (see
Landrum et al., 2019). Participants were randomly as-
signed to one of four conditions that determined which
30-second video clip they saw. Participants then an-
swered questions about the video, including how con-
vincing they and otherswere likely to find it. Lastly, partic-
ipants answered standard demographic questions which
were followed by a fact check statement explaining why
the argument was misinformative. Participants received
$2 upon survey completion.
2.3. Stimulus Materials
As stated above, participants were randomly assigned
into one of four conditions which presented different
flat Earth arguments: (1) a science-based argument,
(2) a conspiracy-based argument, (3) a religious-based
argument, or (4) a sensory-based argument. See the
Supplementary File for descriptions of the videos. The
clips were cut from a YouTube video well known within
the flat Earth community, 200 Proofs the Earth Is Not
a Spinning Ball (Dubay, 2018). The following text pre-
ceded each of the videos: “In the video, 200 Proofs
the Earth Is Flat the narrator makes the following argu-
ment.” A transcription of the narration and the embed-
ded video followed.
2.4. Measures
Only themeasures used for this study are described here.
For more information, see the Supplementary File and
our project page at https://osf.io/h92y5.
2.4.1. Convincingness
After watching the video, participants were reminded of
the argument made and were asked to report how con-
vincing they found it using a slider scale ranging from
0 (not convincing) to 100 (extremely convincing). Later,
participants were asked to rate how convincing they
think other types of people might find the video using
the same scale. These other groups were described as
follows: Republicans, Democrats, people who think the
Bible should be interpreted literally, people who do not
believe God exists (atheists), people who live in rural ar-
eas (country), people who live in urban areas (cities),
people who did not go to college, and people who at-
tended graduate school.
2.4.2. TPP Scores
The dependent variable for this study was the difference
in perceived susceptibility (i.e., TPP score), which was ob-
tained by subtracting one’s own rating of the argument’s
convincingness from one’s expectations of how convinc-
ing each of the other identity groups would find the ar-
gument (e.g., TPP=Other group – Self rating; see Jang &
Kim, 2018; Wei et al., 2011). Therefore, TPP scores could
range from +100 (indicating that the participant thinks
the ‘other’ would be completely convinced whereas the
participant is not at all convinced) to −100 (indicating
that the participant is completely convinced and thinks
that the other would not be convinced at all) for each of
the eight different identity groups (e.g., TPP_rural = rat-
ing for people who live in rural areas – rating for the
‘self’; TPP_biblit = rating for people who believe the
Bible should be interpreted literally – rating for the ‘self’;
Figure 1).
2.4.3. Religiosity
Participants were asked two questions to gauge their re-
ligiosity: (1) howmuch guidance does your faith, religion,
or spirituality provide in your day-to-day life on a 6-point
scale (not religious to a great deal), and (2) do you pray,
and if so, how often, on a 5-point scale (I do not pray
to at least daily). These two items were centered and
scaled before being averaged together and rescaled; reli-
giosity scores ranged from −1.02 to 1.51 (M = 0, SD = 1,
Median = −0.19).
2.4.4. Political Party Affiliation
Political party affiliation was measured with 6 cate-
gories: strong Democrat (n = 58), Democrat (n = 106),
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Figure 1. TPP scores for each identity group across the three studies.
Independent (n = 142), Republican (n = 60), and strong
Republican (n = 20), with an additional option of
‘I choose not to answer’ (n = 11). To reduce the number
of comparison groups, strong Democrat and Democrat
were combined into one response level, ‘Democrat’
(n = 164), and strong Republican and Republican were
combined into one response level, ‘Republican’ (n = 80).
Independent was kept as its own response level, and the
11peoplewho said they prefer not to answerwere coded
as missing. This variable was treated as categorical with
Democrat as the referent in all analyses.
2.4.5. Conspiracy Mentality
Conspiracy mentality was measured using the 5-item
generalized conspiracy mentality scale by Bruder, Haffke,
Neave, Nouripanah, and Imhoff (2013). Participants
were shown each statement, such as ‘many important
things happen in the world, which the public is never in-
formed about,’ and asked whether the statement is (1)
definitely false to (4) definitely true. The five items per-
form well as a scale, predict belief in specific conspiracy
theories (see project page), and have acceptable inter-
item reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .75, 95% CI[.72, .79]).
Participants scores on the conspiracy mentality scale
were approximately normally distributed (M = 2.79,
Median = 2.8, SD = 0.52).
2.4.6. Demographics
We also asked a series of demographic questions includ-
ing participants’ age, gender, whether they live in rural
(23%), urban (26%), or suburban (52%) areas, level of
education, and race/ethnicity. The descriptives for these
variables are reported in Section 2.1.
2.5. Results
2.5.1. Rating the ‘Self’ vs. Rating the ‘Other’
First, we ask whether participants rate others as
more convinced by the flat Earth videos than them-
selves. To examine this, we conducted a within-subjects
ANOVA to test for a difference based on group rated,
F(8, 3160) = 149.9, p < .001. Then, we conducted
planned contrasts, comparing participants’ ratings of
how convincing they thought each of the identity groups
would find the video compared to how convincing they
found it. Study 1 participants reported that each identity
group would be more convinced by the video than them-
selves, except when rating those who attended graduate
school (see Table 1).
2.5.2. Predicting TPP Scores
Next, we aimed to determine whether participants’ own
characteristics (e.g., political party, religiosity) predicted
their TPP for the different identity groups. To examine
this, we conducted regression analyses predicting TPP
scores from condition (video watched) and participants’
political affiliation, religiosity, conspiracy mentality, in-
come, gender, age, area of residence (rural, suburban,
urban), and education level (see Table 2). To determine
the relative importance of the predictors, we conducted
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Table 1. Planned comparisons between ‘self’ and ‘other’ identity groups for how convincing each will find the flat Earth
video across the three studies.
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
Estimate Cohen’s d Estimate Cohen’s d Estimate Cohen’s d
Self vs. Democrats 7.63*** 0.35 3.31 0.11 5.90*** 0.19
Self vs. Republicans 20.26*** 0.63 13.43*** 0.35 3.76* 0.11
Self vs. Bib literalists 39.51*** 1.00 26.99*** 0.62 8.52*** 0.23
Self vs. Atheists 6.72*** 0.25 3.88T 0.13 7.04*** 0.19
Self vs. Rural 22.87*** 0.77 19.77*** 0.58 7.34*** 0.24
Self vs. Urban 7.51*** 0.34 2.72 0.11 3.17* 0.12
Self vs. No College 24.74*** 0.82 22.03*** 0.63 9.37*** 0.28
Self vs. Grad School −0.03 0.00 −8.07*** −0.32 −0.67 0.02
Notes: Tp < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
lmg tests (Grömping, 2006; Lindeman, Merenda, & Gold,
1980), which partitions R2 by averaging sequential sums
of squares (Type I) across all orderings of predictors.
When predicting TPP, where the ‘other’ is described
as a Democrat or Republican, participants’ own reli-
giosity and political affiliation were the strongest in-
fluencers. Among our participants, the greater one’s
religiosity, the less they believe Republicans will be
more convinced than themselves by flat Earth videos
(b = −6.08, p < .001)—that is, the TPP score for
Republicans decreases with increasing religiosity. On the
other hand, greater religiosity marginally predicts believ-
ing that Democrats will be more convinced than them-
selves by flat Earth videos (b = 2.86, p = .049)—that is,
the TPP score for Democrats slightly increases with in-
creasing religiosity (see Figure 2).
Participants’ own political affiliation also influenced
TPP of Democrats and Republicans. Independents ex-
pected larger gaps between Democrats and themselves
(that is, a TPP score greater than 0; MTPP_Democ = 12.83,
SD = 25.76) and between Republicans and them-
selves (MTPP_Repub = 19.99, SD = 30.86). Republican
participants, reasonably, expected smaller gaps be-
tween Republicans and themselves (that is, a TPP
score closer to 0; MTPP_Repub = 3.62, SD = 33.13)
than Democrat participants expected when rat-
ing Republicans (MTPP_Repub = 29.76, SD = 32.94).
Notably, however, Republican participants and Demo-
crat participants did not vary significantly when
rating Democrats (Republicans rating Democrats:
MTPP_Democ = 9.91, SD = 33.13; Democrats rating Demo-
crats:MTPP_Democ = 3.05, SD = 17.00).
When predicting TPP where the ‘other’ is de-
scribed as living in urban or rural areas, participants’
own political party affiliation was the strongest in-
fluencer. Most notably, Republicans expected smaller
gaps—TPP scores closer to 0—between rural dwellers
and themselves (MTPP_Rural = 7.58, SD = 26.0) than
Democrats expected (MTPP_Rural = 29.7, SD = 29.5,
p < .001). Furthermore, independents expected larger
differences between themselves and urban dwellers
(MTPP_Urban = 12.0, SD = 21.99) than Democrats ex-
pected (MTPP_Urban = 6.19, SD = 19.32; p = .013).
However, Republicans’ expectations (MTPP_Urban = 4.38,
SD = 24.22) did not significantly differ from Democrats’
expectations (p = .609)
There was also an influence of conspiracy mental-
ity: People with greater conspiracy mentality expected
smaller gaps between rural dwellers and themselves
than those with lower conspiracy mentality expected
(b = −6.59, p = .033).
More factors significantly predicted TPP where the
‘other’ is described as a biblical literalist, and the
strongest predictors were the participant’s religiosity
and political party, as well as whether the participant
saw the religious appeal. Understandably, participants
who saw the clip appealing to scripture as evidence
of a flat Earth expected much larger gaps between
biblical literalists and themselves (MTPP_Biblit = 61.17,
SD = 34.42) than people who saw the conspiracy appeal
(MTPP_Biblit = 29.04, SD = 36.24, p < .001; see Table 2).
Moreover, participants’ religiosity played a signifi-
cant role when rating atheists and biblical literalists.
Greater religiosity predicted smaller gaps between par-
ticipants’ ratings of themselves and biblical literalists
(b = −10.55, p < .001) and greater gaps between them-
selves and atheists (b = 5.52, p < .001).
Participants’ political affiliations also influenced
their ratings of biblical literalists. Republicans expected
smaller gaps between biblical literalists and themselves
(MTPP_Biblit = 19.09, SD = 37.95) than Democrats ex-
pected (MTPP_Biblit = 51.74, SD = 37.5, p < .001).
Independents also expected smaller gaps between bib-
lical literalists and themselves (MTPP_Biblit = 38.84,
SD = 37.67) than Democrats expected (p = .010).
When predicting TPP where the ‘other’ did not at-
tend college, participant’s own political affiliation was
the only significant influencer. Republicans expected
smaller gaps between themselves and people who did
not attend college (MTPP_NoCollege = 10.91, SD = 28.09)
than Democrats expected (MTPP_NoCollege = 30.04,
SD = 30.13; b = −15.61, p < .001). Moreover, no factors
were significant when predicting TPP scores for those
who attended graduate school. However, as noted ear-
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Table 2. GLM analyses for each identity group. Non-standardized regression coefficients are shown.
Characteristic defining the ‘other’
Political identity Area of residence Religiosity Education
Dem Repub Urban Rural Atheist BibLit Grad No College
Condition (ref = Conspiracy appeal)
Religious 3.64 6.37 0.63 3.70 −4.59 31.60*** 1.51 0.83
Science 1.85 5.82 1.42 2.76 −3.34 7.05 −1.59 3.34
Sensory 1 1.96 0.42 4.79 1.35 −2.94 −0.09 4.00 2.15
Sensory 2 3.12 2.60 3.95 3.89 −1.02 −0.25 0.55 1.46
Participant Characteristics
Political Party (ref = Democrat)
Independent 9.47** −6.16T 6.52* −0.88 1.81 −10.64* 3.06 0.61
Republican 4.07 −18.81*** −1.64 −17.59*** 0.28 −23.74*** 0.76 −15.61***
Religiosity 2.86* −6.08*** 0.65 −2.43 6.40*** −11.39*** 0.73 −1.54
Conspiracy Mentality −4.28 −5.38T −4.37T −6.59* −3.87 −0.33 −0.82 −4.63
Income −0.80 −0.65 −0.16 −0.08 −0.64 −0.19 −0.53 0.59
Gender −2.10 0.70 −2.54 2.35 −6.44* 1.74 −0.35 3.30
Age −0.12 −0.03 −0.08 −0.15 −0.04 0.33* 0.05 −0.14
Area (ref = Urban)
Rural 6.65T 0.84 6.18T −5.10 0.31 3.13 −0.18 −0.53
Suburban −1.20 −0.14 1.23 −0.65 −1.26 2.85 −3.90 −0.37
Education 0.50 3.03 0.57 1.26 −0.46 1.23 −0.46 2.52T
Notes: Tp < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
lier, this was the one group participants rated as nomore
likely to be convinced than themselves (see Figure 1).
2.6. Discussion
Study 1 was exploratory, aiming to examine which iden-
tity groups YouTube users believe are more suscepti-
ble than themselves to the arguments presented in flat
Earth videos and whether these beliefs are conditional
on participants’ own characteristics (aim 1). Supporting
prior TPP work, we found that participants exhibited a
‘self’–‘other’ bias, believing that the ‘other’ groups (with
the exception of those who attended graduate school)
would bemore convinced by flat Earth videos than them-
selves. Participants believed biblical literalists, in partic-
ular, would be the most susceptible to flat Earth ar-
guments in YouTube videos, especially when those ar-
guments appeal to religious texts. In addition to bibli-
cal literalists, participants also expected people who did
not go to college, people who live in rural areas, and
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Figure 2. Predicted TPP scores (‘other’ minus ‘self,’ i.e., difference score) when rating how much more convincing
Democrats and Republicans will find the flat Earth videos compared to oneself, and how this predicted difference score
varies based on the participants’ religiosity.
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people who vote Republican to be more susceptible to
flat Earth videos. Notably, these TPP were predicted by
participants’ own religiosity and political affiliation. The
strongest biases were expressed by those with lower re-
ligiosity. These non-religious individuals may have been
more prevalent in our sample as we recruited partici-
pants from MTurk.
3. Studies 2 and 3
Studies 2 and 3 aimed to replicate the findings from
study 1 that (1) supported prior literature by elucidat-
ing a ‘self’–‘other’ bias (here, in perceived susceptibility
to flat Earth YouTube videos), (2) suggested that respon-
dents believe biblical literalists would be the most sus-
ceptible to flat Earth videos, and (3) showed that par-
ticipants’ TPP were primarily driven by their own (lack
of) religiosity and their political party affiliations (aim 1).
Moreover, studies 2 and 3 aimed to examine the ex-
tent to which perceptions of social distance predict TPP
(aim 1) and the extent to which TPP predict support for
censoring YouTube (aim 2). Whereas study 2 included
a participant sample similar to study 1 (YouTube users
recruited from MTurk), study 3 included a larger and
more diverse participant sample, recruited by Qualtrics
Research Services to match census, and not restricted
based on YouTube use (as YouTube users may be less
likely to want to censor the platform).
3.1. Study 2 Participants
We recruited 404 U.S. participants, who regularly
use YouTube, in the summer of 2019 via TurkPrime.
Overall, 53% of the participants were female, and
racial/ethnic breakdowns were as follows: 72% White,
8% Black/African American, 2% Hispanic/Latino, 6%
Asian, and 1% Other. The average age of participants in
this sample was 35.82 years (median = 33, SD = 11.63).
As with study 1, this sample was highly educated: 12%
only completed high school, 33% attended some college,
38% received a four-year college degree, and 15% stated
that they completed graduate school. This sample was
also predominantly liberal leaning: about 54% report vot-
ing Democrat, 10% report voting independent, 21% re-
port voting Republican, and 15% report not voting.
3.2. Study 3 Participants
A sample of 1,005 participants were recruited in winter
2019 byQualtrics Research Services tomatchU.S. census
on gender, age, education, household income, region,
and race/ethnicity. The final samplewas 56% female, and
racial/ethnic breakdowns were as follows: 61% White,
14% Black/African American, 4.5% Hispanic/Latino, 4.5%
Asian, and 2% Other. The average age of participants in
this sample was 44.12 years (median = 42, SD = 17.03).
Regarding education, 13% did not finish high school,
25% completed only high school, 21% attended some
college, 20% received a four-year college degree, and
12% stated that they completed graduate school. About
40% report typically voting Democrat, 9% report voting
Independent, 29% report voting Republican, and 22% re-
port not voting. Also, unlike study 2, we did not limit this
study to YouTube users, but use of the platform was still
high. Almost half of the sample reported using it daily,
25% at least weekly, 9% at least monthly, 7% less often
than monthly, and 11% report never using it.
3.3. Study Design and Procedures
Study design and hypotheses for studies 2 and 3 were
pre-registered prior to data collection. The full pre-
registered analyses can be found at https://osf.io/h92y5.
Unlike study 1, participants in studies 2 and 3 were
not randomized into different video conditions (though
202 participants in Study 3 were not shown any video
to serve as a control sample). Instead, participants were
shown the same 5-minute video called flat Earth in
5 Minutes produced by ODD TV and posted on the ODD
Reality YouTube channel. The videowas originally posted
in 2017, and, at the time of data collection, had over
1.2 million views. Participants could skip the video af-
ter one minute. Study 2 participants were on the page
an average of 5.65 minutes (median = 5.2, SD = 5.14),
and study 3 participants were on the page an average of
4.75 minutes (median = 5.2, SD = 3.16).
Afterwards, participants answered questions about
their perceptions of the video, about how others might
view the video, about potential censorship of flat Earth
videos on YouTube, how different the other groups
were than themselves (i.e., social distance), and stan-
dard demographic questions, which were followed by
a fact check statement that provided several ways that
the viewer can test the shape of the Earth to see
that it is not flat. TurkPrime participants received $2
upon completion.
3.4. Measures
The variables measured in the second study were the
same as the first with a few important additions: an in-
dex formeasuring beliefs that YouTube should censor flat
Earth content and ratings of perceived social distance.
We describe these in more detail below. Also, we asked
the political affiliation question a bit differently, focus-
ing on whom they typically vote for (e.g., the Democratic
candidate, the Republican candidate) as opposed to how
they categorize themselves. For the full list of measures
see the Supplementary File.
3.4.1. Call for Censorship
One new component to this survey asked participants
about censoring flat Earth videos on YouTube. For these
items, participants were shown a series of statements
and asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed
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with those statements (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly
agree = 6). See Table 3 for the list of items.
In our preregistration, we stated we would use an av-
eraged index for these items, and we report that anal-
ysis in this article. The items have good inter-item reli-
ability and a scree ‘acceleration factor’ test shows evi-
dence for one factor. However, the non-graphical solu-
tions (e.g., parallel analysis, optimal coordinates anal-
ysis) suggest a two-factor solution. This analysis is re-
ported at https://osf.io/h92y5.
3.4.2. Social Distance
Also new to this study, we asked participants to rate how
similar or dissimilar people from various groups are to
themselves (e.g., Eveland et al., 1999). Participants read
the following: ‘For each of the following identity groups,
please tell us whether you feel that the people in this
group—whether you belong to the group or not—are a
lot like you or not at all like you.’ Like for the self-report
and the third-person ratings, participants answered this
question using a slider scale from 0 to 100. We reverse
coded these variables so that higher values (100) re-
flected ‘Not at all like me’ and lower values (0) reflected
‘A lot like me.’
Participants were asked about each of the iden-
tity groups they rated earlier in the survey, including
Republicans (S2: M = 61.15, SD = 31.25; S3: M = 52.65,
SD = 32.97), Democrats (S2: M = 41.24, SD = 31.2; S3:
M= 47.85, SD= 32.77), biblical literalists (S2:M= 71.94,
SD = 32.42; S3: M = 56.27, SD = 33.32), atheists (S2:
M = 49.77, SD = 32.42; S3: M = 64.72, SD = 32.58), ru-
ral dwellers (S2: M = 54.28, SD = 29.22; S3: M = 47.76,
SD = 30.57), urban dwellers (S2:M = 37.92, SD = 25.27;
S3: M = 39.10, SD = 28.43), people who did not go
to college (S2: M = 58.34, SD = 28.91; S3: M = 49.87,
SD = 31.38), and people who attended graduate school
(S2:M = 41.09, SD = 28.53; S3:M = 46.67, SD = 30.87).
Our data, code, and full pre-registered analysis are
available at https://osf.io/h92y5.
3.5. Results
3.5.1. Rating the ‘Self’ vs. Rating the ‘Other’
Based on study 1 results, our first hypothesis was that
participants would rate each of the identity groups as
finding the videomore convincing then they, themselves,
do, except when rating people who attended gradu-
ate school. This hypothesis was partially supported in
study 2 and fully supported in study 3 (see Table 1).
Consistent with study 1, planned contrasts between rat-
ings for the ‘self’ and ‘others’ found that, on average,
participants in study 2 expected the following groups to
be more convinced by the flat Earth video than them-
selves: Republicans, biblical literalists, people who live
in rural areas, and people who did not go to college. In
contrast, study 2 participants, on average, expected peo-
ple with graduate degrees to be less convinced than they
were, whereas study 1 found no significant differences.
Moreover, study 2 found no significant differences be-
tween ‘self’ vs. ‘other’ ratings when rating Democrats
and when rating urban dwellers. In contrast, like study 1,
study 3 expected each of the groups to be more con-
vinced by the flat Earth video than themselves, except
for those who attended graduate school (see Table 1).
3.5.2. Predicting TPP Scores
Our second hypothesis, based on study 1 results, was
that religiosity and party affiliation would be two of
the strongest predictors of TPP. We also wanted to de-
termine whether social distance was a better predic-
tor of TPP scores than other individual differences vari-
ables. As with study 1, we conducted regression analyses
(see Table 4) and lmg tests of relative importance (see
Table 3. Censorship items.
Study 2 Study 3
n = 404 n = 1,005
YouTube should… M(SD) Median M(SD) Median
shut down or delete channels that upload flat Earth videos 1.98(1.22) Disagree 2.61(1.51) Disagree
ban users who upload flat Earth videos 1.93(1.17) Disagree 2.58(1.52) Disagree
delete videos that argue the Earth is flat 2.02(1.22) Disagree 2.68(1.55) Disagree
be fined for distributing flat Earth videos 1.73(1.73) Disagree 2.37(1.48) Disagree
demonetize channels that upload flat Earth videos 2.76(1.52) Somewhat 3.25(1.56) Somewhat
disagree disagree
refrain from recommending flat Earth videos to other users 3.34(1.59) Somewhat 3.38(1.51) Somewhat
disagree disagree
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.86 95% CI[0.84, 0.88] 0.85 95% CI[0.84, 0.87]
Scale Descriptives M = 2.29, SD = 1.00 M = 2.81, SD = 1.15
Notes: Participants were shown a series of statements and asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with those statements on a
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
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Table 4. GLM analyses for each identity group.
Characteristic defining the ‘Other’
Biblical Grad No
S Democ Repub Urban Rural Atheist Literalists School College
Perceived social 2 −0.03 0.39*** 0.02 0.26*** 0.11T 0.45 ∗ ∗∗ 0.03 0.26***
distance 3 −0.18*** 0.04 0.10* 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** −0.01 0.13**
Political party (Ref = Democrat)
Republican 2 11.76* −5.78 1.86 −12.10** 6.15 −14.83** −3.59 −5.03
3 8.57* −5.31 5.14T −5.61T 5.08 −4.70 5.31* 0.41
Independent 2 2.36 0.15 −0.77 −3.32 2.66 2.31 −5.32 0.06
3 7.87 −5.14 −2.97 −2.81 −6.02 −10.94* 2.61 −3.58
Other 2 1.50 −12.47* 0.03 −9.13T −7.10 −6.85 −10.29** −10.90*
3 2.44 −1.41 −0.01 −4.77 0.34 −3.01 1.29 −2.15
Religiosity 2 −1.42 −6.98** −1.44 −8.38*** −0.84 −5.72* −0.19 −8.47***
3 0.66 −5.14*** 1.24 −5.21*** −2.31 −4.76** 1.75 −4.51**
Conspiracy 2 −3.21 −5.14 −6.11* −5.89* −1.85 −12.54*** −4.59T −6.12*
mentality 3 3.23* 1.92 2.10 3.03T 3.12T 1.49 1.61 4.90**
Income 2 −0.23 −0.72 −0.12 −0.73 −0.48 −1.07 −0.35 −0.03
3 −0.45 0.32 −0.98T 0.13 −0.52 −0.07 −0.87 0.13
Gender (1 =Male) 2 0.52 2.10 0.84 0.60 −3.57 −0.77 −3.31 0.22
3 −0.08 −0.06 −0.08 −1.20 −1.62 −1.35 −1.20 −0.53
Age 2 0.12 −0.10 −0.07 0.20 0.20 −0.03 0.07 −0.13
3 −0.04 0.16T −0.08 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.05
Area (Ref = Urban)
Rural 2 1.70 2.87 3.51 9.08T 0.72 −0.18 1.15 0.15
3 12.61*** 4.56 5.80T 9.94** 13.28** 7.10t 9.58** 9.52**
Suburban 2 −1.38 5.15 1.04 10.78** 2.20 6.06 2.14 0.10
3 6.75* 3.53 1.82 8.35** 3.43 6.13T 0.81 8.62**
Education 2 −0.20 1.54 −0.17 1.09 −1.22 1.61 −1.45 1.61
3 2.06* 1.23 1.32 2.19* 1.47 1.56 −0.40 1.77
Tp < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; S column stands for study, and the numbers 2 and 3 indicate to which study sample the value
belongs. Non-standardized regression coefficients are shown.
Figure 3). Supporting our hypotheses, religiosity, party af-
filiation, and social distancewere the strongest predictors
of TPP in both studies 2 and 3 (at least for the categories
in which study 2 participants perceived the group to be
more susceptible to the arguments made in the video
than themselves). It is notable that social distance is not
always the strongest predictor, and in study 3, area of res-
idence and religiosity are also strongly predictive of TPP.
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Figure 3. Relative importance of the predictors for studies 2 and 3. Please note the vertical axes differ for the two figures.
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Table 5. Simple correlations between the average censorship score and the TPP scores.
Study 2 Study 3
Group rated Pearson’s r 95% CI Pearson’s r 95% CI
Democrats 0.10* [0.01, 0.20] 0.00 [−0.07, 0.07]
Republicans 0.26*** [0.17, 0.35] 0.11** [0.04, 0.17]
Urban 0.17*** [0.08, 0.27] 0.05 [−0.02, 0.12]
Rural 0.23*** [0.14, 0.32] 0.01 [−0.06, 0.08]
Atheists 0.08 [−0.02, 0.18] −0.05 [−0.12, 0.02]
Biblical literalists 0.22*** [0.12, 0.31] 0.06T [0.00, 0.14]
Graduate school 0.12* [0.02, 0.21] 0.10** [0.04, 0.17]
No college 0.23*** [0.13, 0.32] 0.01 [−0.06, 0.08]
Notes: Tp < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
3.5.3. Predicting Censorship of YouTube
Our third hypothesis was that TPP scores would predict
support for censoring YouTube. We tested this hypothe-
sis in two ways. First, we conducted simple correlations.
There were positive associations between most of the
TPP scores and the censorship scores for study 2, but not
for study 3. TPP scores for Republicans and those who
attended graduate school were the only two that were
significantly correlated with censorship scores for both
study 2 and study 3 (see Table 5).
Next, we conducted regression analyses and tests of
relative importance, predicting censorship scores from
the TPP scores as well as from YouTube use, conspiracy
mentality, political party affiliation, religiosity, gender,
income, and area of residence. It is worth noting that
many of the TPP scores are correlated with one another
(see Table 6).
Therefore, to avoid issues with multicollinearity, we
used data reduction techniques. A parallel analysis, opti-
mal coordinates analysis, and evaluation of eigenvalues
on the study 2 sample suggest that there are two dimen-
sions. We conducted a maximum likelihood factor analy-
sis, extracting two factorswith promax (oblique) rotation.
TPP scores for Republicans (0.85), rural dwellers (0.97),
biblical literalists (0.73), and people who did not attend
college (0.76) loaded onto the first factor. In contrast,
TPP scores for Democrats (0.95), urban dwellers (0.72),
atheists (0.74), and people who attended graduate
school (0.69) loaded onto the second factor.
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis for the
study 3 sample using the two-factor solution. The two
factor solution was close, but not a good fit for study 3
(𝜒2 = 138.97, p < .001; SRMR = 0.037; RMSEA = 0.09,
95% CI[0.078, 0.107]; CFI = 0.963). Supplementary ana-
lyses suggest a one-factor solution would be more ap-
propriate. Therefore, when analyzing study 3 data, we
used an averaged index of the TPP scores. That a two fac-
tor solution was appropriate for study 2 but not study 3
is understandable given the differences in the samples:
MTurkers, who leanmore liberal and less religious than a
nationally representative population, may be more likely
Table 6. Pearson correlations among TPP scores for study 2 and study 3.
Study DEM REP URB RRL ATH BLT GRD NC
Democrat (DEM) 2 1.00 0.32*** 0.68*** 0.31*** 0.62*** 0.40*** 0.62*** 0.45***3
Republican (REP) 2 1.00 0.47*** 0.75*** 0.35*** 0.68*** 0.47*** 0.67***3 0.35***
Urban (URB) 2 1.00 0.45*** 0.54*** 0.45*** 0.61*** 0.53***3 0.64*** 0.47***
Rural (RRL) 2 1.00 0.29*** 0.67*** 0.38*** 0.75***3 0.44*** 0.65*** 0.48***
Atheist (ATH) 2 1.00 0.23*** 0.55*** 0.39***3 0.59*** 0.41*** 0.54*** 0.46***
Bibl lit (BLT) 2 1.00 0.41*** 0.64***3 0.40*** 0.64*** 0.47*** 0.61*** 0.38***
Graduate sch (GRD) 2 1.00 0.37***3 0.56*** 0.47*** 0.60*** 0.37*** 0.42*** 0.40***
No college (NC) 2 1.003 0.50*** 0.57*** 0.51*** 0.68*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.40***
Notes: Tp < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Table 7. Predicting censorship scores. Non-standardized regression coefficients are shown.
Study 2 Study 3
b F lmg b F lmg
YouTube Use −0.10 0.85 0.23% −0.06 2.50 0.41%
TPP—F1 0.01* 5.11* 3.85% 0.00 1.22 0.17%
TPP—F2 0.00 1.15 1.12% NA NA NA
Party (ref = Democ) 4.76** 4.79% 0.51 0.24%
Republican −0.50*** −0.02
Independent −0.30T −0.19
Other −0.32* 0.05
Religiosity 0.02 0.06 0.61% 0.08 2.25 0.65%
Conspiracy mentality −0.08 0.70 0.54% −0.12* 5.46* 0.43%
Income 0.01 0.09 0.05% −0.05* 4.10* 0.03%
Gender −0.01 0.01 0.05% −0.02 0.03 0.40%
Area (ref = Urban) 0.04 0.10% 1.32 0.40%
Rural −0.03 0.06
Suburban −0.03 −0.13
Education 0.03 0.58 0.44% 0.07* 3.90* 0.24%
Notes: Tp < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
to see stronger divides than a more representative sam-
ple, grouping together Democrats, urban dwellers, athe-
ists, and peoplewho attended graduate school in one bin
and Republicans, rural dwellers, biblical literalists, and
people who did not go to college in another.
In study 2, we found partial support for our hypothe-
sis that TPP scores predict censorship: Specifically, TPP
scores for the dimension that captured perceptions of
Republicans, biblical literalists, rural dwellers, and peo-
ple who did not go to college. It is worth noting, though,
that political partywas a stronger predictor of censorship
scores than TPP scores; participants political party affilia-
tion explained approximately 4.76% of the response vari-
ance, whereas TPP scores (factor 1) explained approx-
imately 3.85% of the response variance. Moreover, in
study 3, however, we did not find support for our hypoth-
esis. TPP scores did not significantly predict censorship
and explained approximately only 0.24% of the response
variance (see Table 7).
4. Discussion
This article presents three studies examining two re-
search aims. Our first aim was to determine which iden-
tity groups people believe are more susceptible than
themselves to flat Earth videos, and whether these TPP
are conditional on participants’ own characteristics. For
studies 1 and 2, people who believe the Bible should be
interpreted literally (i.e., biblical literalists) were viewed
as the most susceptible to flat Earth arguments on
YouTube. This is unsurprising given the historical connec-
tion of flat Earth and its associated beliefs (e.g., geocen-
tricism) to biblical literalism as well as the many appeals
by the flat Earth community to the Bible as a source of ev-
idence. In study 3, people without college degrees were
seen as being as susceptible as biblical literalists.
Supporting prior TPP literature, our studies find a
‘self’–‘other’ bias in which participants generally rated
the ‘other’ groups as beingmore susceptible to flat Earth
videos than themselves, and this is predicted by per-
ceived social distance (supporting the social distance
corollary; cf. Eveland et al., 1999). However, it is not only
social distance that predicts TPP. Participants’ own re-
ligiosity and political party are also strongly predictive,
even when accounting for the other factors.
Our second aimwas to determine the extent towhich
these TPP predict support for censorship of YouTube.
Before discussing these results, a few points are impor-
tant to note. First, support for censorship was generally
low among the YouTube users who composed our sam-
ple for study 2. We thought it was possible that support
for censorship would increase in a more representative
sample not restricted to YouTube users (but controlling
for YouTube use). However, this also was not the case.
Although support for censorship was slightly higher for
study 3 than for study 2, the distribution of scores were
still positively skewed with a floor effect. Second, there
seemed to be an effect of seeing a flat Earth video on
support for censorship in the unexpected direction. In
study 3, we included a sub sample of participants who
did not see any video but were still asked the censorship
questions. Participants who did not see the flat Earth
video (M = 3.01 of 6, SD = 1.05) were more open to
censoring flat Earth videos than participants who had
seen the video (M = 2.76, SD = 1.17), t(338.30) = 2.99,
p < .003.
We only found partial support for the hypothesis that
TPP scores predict the desire for censorship. In fact, there
were differences between our two samples (study 2 and
study 3). In study 2, the TPP scores for most of the iden-
tity groups were correlated with censorship scores, and
oneof the TPP factors (i.e., the oneonwhichRepublicans,
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biblical literalists, rural dwellers, and people who did not
go to college loaded) predicted desire for censorship.
For study 3, however, only two of the TPP scores—the
ones for Republicans and people who attended graduate
school—predicted censorship scores, and the TPP aver-
age score did not predict desire for censorship when ac-
counting for other factors.
These results are not entirely inconsistent with prior
work on TPE. On one hand, TPP have been shown to
predict support for censorship for several socially unde-
sirable messages, such as violence and sexual content
on television (Gunther & Hwa, 1996; Rojas et al., 1996),
advertising for cigarettes, alcohol, and gambling (Shah,
Faber, & Youn, 1999), rap music (McLeod, Eveland, &
Nathanson, 1997), and for the media in general (Rojas
et al., 1996). On the other hand, several other studies
failed to find associations between TPP and support for
censorship. These studies included support for censor-
ing the O. J. Simpson trial (Salwen & Driscoll, 1997) and
Holocaust-denial material (Price, Tewksbury, & Huang,
1998), and for the regulation of political communications
(Rucinski & Salmon, 1990). Thus, there does not seem to
be a clear relationship between TPP and censorship atti-
tudes, and message type may have a moderating effect.
5. Conclusions
Because YouTube recently announced modifications to
its recommendation algorithms and specifically men-
tioned flat Earth in its announcement (YouTube, 2019),
it is evident that the management at YouTube is con-
cerned about the influence of these videos on the pub-
lic. Undoubtedly, YouTube was facing public pressure
to take some action as a result of recent issues, such
as articles blaming YouTube’s algorithms for the rise in
flat Earthers and promotion of other conspiracies, like
QAnon (Coaston, 2018). Presumably, those who support
regulation of such content, as well as YouTube’s upper
management who implemented these regulations, hold
strong TPP, and they may have overestimated the ef-
fects these videos would have on others. Though our re-
search only partially supports the theory that the gen-
eral public would support censoring flat Earth videos on
YouTube based on their own TPP, such perceptions may
have played a significant role in these executives’ deci-
sion making.
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